The main criticisms in relation to the court’s proceedings I am aware of are related to: 1) the length of proceedings (the main issue of concern for the German Parliament); 2) the arguably limited number of cases brought before the Court since 2002; 3) the alleged high cost of its operation in comparison to its overall performance and effectiveness (The Elders, group of former world leaders); 4) the alleged Prosecutor’s focus on certain regions of the world (Africa); 5) the fact that recently situations have been brought before the Court (Afghanistan, Palestine), the judicial examination of which involves nationals of powerful states that have not ratified the Rome Statute (and thus there is a violation of the respective state’s sovereignty). Thankfully, the Court has repeatedly provided convincing answers to many points of the aforementioned criticism, while the recent appearances of ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji on BBC HARDtalk in 23 June 2020 and The Conflict Zone on Deutsche Welle in 2019 constitute exemplary responses to much of this critique.

I believe that the Court should increase its outreach activities. Additionally, court officials and judges could increase their presence and participation at academic conferences and publications. Moreover, I believe that raising the donations to the Trust Fund for Victims is an issue of critical importance. Finally, I believe that the Victims and Witnesses Unit should be allocated more funds and human resources in order for victims and witnesses to feel that they and their families are well protected and hence do not fear testifying and assisting the Court with its critical mission for humanity.

One of the decisions that has had an important positive impact in relation to the Court’s perception vis-à-vis the States Parties and the public was The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi decision of Trial Chamber VIII of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 27 September 2016. In this case, the Chamber unanimously found Mr Al Mahdi guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-perpetrator of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali in June and July 2012. On 22 August 2016, at the opening of the trial, Mr Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to the war crime consisting in attacking ten historic and religious monuments in Timbuktu (Mali) in June and July 2012. This was the first time an accused before the ICC admitted ab initio his/her guilt. The expeditious outcome of this case as well as the message to the international community that the Court is a principal protector of humanity’s cultural heritage and fully respects victims’ right to reparation to the best of the Trust Fund’s resources (around €2,7 million for individual and collective reparations awards, with clear priority given to individual awards; in May 2018, the TFV Board allocated €1,350,000 and undertook fundraising efforts to secure the remainder) was heralded by the international press and media as clear evidence of the Court’s strong will to promote justice, shield human civilization and care for victims.

On the other hand, one of the decisions which was viewed as having a negative impact in relation to its perception vis-à-vis the States Parties and the public was the Bemba Appeals Chamber decision. Leila N. Sadat eloquently summarized the main criticisms of the Appeals Chamber decision in Bemba in June 2018 on the eminent blog EJIl:Talk under the title “Fiddling While Rome Burns? The Appeals Chamber’s Curious Decision in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”. The critique was mainly focused on the prolonged judicial process, the Prosecutor’s alleged deficiencies, the considerable allocation of fiscal and human resources on the said case and the overturn of the unanimous Trial Chamber’s decision by a divided Appeals Chamber (3-2), which eventually led to the exoneration of the accused. However, one should not overlook that at the same time the Court proved undeniably that the conferment of justice and not the mere conviction of an accused is its principal and legitimate aim.

I firmly believe that an international judge should keep his/her distance from the authorities of his/her country of origin in order to secure his/her independency and impartiality. Moreover, if elected as a judge to the ICC I shall resign from my position as Executive Director from the NGO Intellectum, after 14 years of continuous service. Finally, as far as universities and academic institutions are concerned I have currently no active affiliations, however do candidly believe that a judge should be allowed to participate occasionally in academia because his/her participation can significantly assist in the dissemination of the Court’s work and legacy. Nevertheless, in any case, a judge must be clear when collaborating with outside agencies and individuals that his/her independence and impartiality is of utmost significance and prevails over all other duties and obligations imposed upon him/her.

I strongly believe that, especially for reasons linked to the general perception of fairness by the public/international community, a judge should not participate under normal circumstances in a trial involving a national from his /her country of origin. This approach fully conforms with the lege artis interpretation of Article 41§2(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICCRSt)

First of all, it should be underlined that none of the statutes of the preexisting international criminal tribunals contained a provision regarding the ‘applicable law’. Therefore, in the field of international criminal justice before the ratification of the Rome Statute by 60 states in July 2002, the judges were traditionally left to determine themselves the additional sources of law that they would draw upon, and the relative weight of the said sources. However, pursuant to Article 21 ICCRSt under the title “Applicable law”, the Court shall apply primarily the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter RPE). Secondly, “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict” can be applied where appropriate; “Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world […] The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights…” [my emphasis] Consequently Article 21 ICCRSt is a legal innovation quite different in content than the provision regarding the authoritative list of sources of public international law set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter SICJ):[1]

Therefore, eminent sources of international law could be taken into account where appropriate and relevant, including the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as the decisions of the Human Rights Council. Hence in Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that ‘those other sources of law provided for in paragraphs (l)(b) and (l)(c) of article 21 of the Statute, can only be applied when the following two conditions are met: (i) there is a lacuna in the written law contained in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules; and (ii) such lacuna cannot be filled by the application of the criteria provided for in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties and article 21(3) of the Statute’.[2]

[1] Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice verbatim states: “The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” See also William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on The Rome Statute (OUP 2016), p. 511 et sub.

[2] Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 126.

An independent judge of the ICC should pay utmost respect to the precedents established by the Appeals Chamber of the Court. This should happen not only due to the ethical responsibility of a new judge but also because the Rome Statute dictates so. In particular Article 21 ICCRSt under the title “Applicable law” the Court expressly states in its second paragraph that “The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions” (my emphasis). Unequivocally, the said provision is different than the provision of Article 59 SICJ, which declares that “the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”; however it expressly defines the distinct legal philosophy of the Rome Statute and the fact that in criminal cases of such gravity a precedent cannot be easily overlooked. On the other hand, Article 21§2 ICCRSt rejects the stare decisis principle, because the provision is of an advisory and not mandatory nature (“may apply”). Nor does the provision prima facie establish any hierarchy in terms of the decisions of the various Chambers of the Court, as it was ruled quite early on that the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers are not ‘inferior courts’.[1] However de lege ferenda a precedent of the Appeals Chamber should be followed in most subsequent cases as rightly pointed out by eminent academics.[2] Certainly this does not exclude the rare possibility of an established precedent not being followed in another similar case, especially when the precedent in question concerns a particularly complex legal issue on which the Chamber itself is far from unanimous. However, on such an exceptional occasion, there must be compelling and extraordinary reasons for a judge to depart from the well-established case law of the Appeals Chamber; reasons that the current nominee finds difficult to envisage, although theoretically their existence cannot be excluded.

[1] The Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Court are in noway inferior courts in the sense that inferior courts are perceived and classified inEngland and Wales. Hence, any comparison between them and inferior courts underEnglish law is misleadingSituation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04), Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, 13 July 2006, page 12, para. 30, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01806.PDF.

[2] William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on The Rome Statute (OUP 2016), pp. 526-527.

Efficiency is always a critical factor and indicator of the quality of the judicial function and conferment of justice overall. Therefore, I believe that in cooperation with the President of the Court and my learned colleagues I will be able to propose and implement innovative procedural practices, which would enhance the conferment of justice. One innovative procedural practice that I believe might prove to be particularly effective and which I would like to propose is linked to the COVID-19 health crisis and similar or even worse pandemics that might occur in the future, as forecast by the World Health Organisation.

Given the evident drawbacks of teleconferencing (the great time zone differences between all interested parties (accused, counsel, prosecutor, witnesses, victims, accused, judges, interperters/court’s staff members) and the inevitable connection problems (as witnessed firsthand by the nominee during a recent ICC disciplinary hearing) and the need for justice to be conferred live and in person, I would suggest the following: a protocol for the courtroom’s sanitisation as well as participants’ disinfection before entering the court (eg. all participants required to wear face shields and stay in personal booths with minimal contact to each other) and the installation of special devices which will disinfect the clothes and objects of all participants before entering the courtroom (e.g. disinfection chambers) and constantly clean the air while all persons are inside the courtroom. The adoption of such a procedural innovation will not merely allow the Court to operate normally during a pandemic but will also place the ICC at the forefornt of procedural innovation and enhance its international status via its innovative approach to working seamlessly while ensuring the safety of judges, staff and participants.

Efficiency is always a critical factor and indicator of the quality of the judicial function and conferment of justice overall. Therefore, I believe that in cooperation with the President of the Court and my learned colleagues I will be able to propose and implement innovative procedural practices, which would enhance the conferment of justice. One innovative procedural practice that I believe might prove to be particularly effective and which I would like to propose is linked to the COVID-19 health crisis and similar or even worse pandemics that might occur in the future, as forecast by the World Health Organisation.

Given the evident drawbacks of teleconferencing (the great time zone differences between all interested parties (accused, counsel, prosecutor, witnesses, victims, accused, judges, interperters/court’s staff members) and the inevitable connection problems (as witnessed firsthand by the nominee during a recent ICC disciplinary hearing) and the need for justice to be conferred live and in person, I would suggest the following: a protocol for the courtroom’s sanitisation as well as participants’ disinfection before entering the court (eg. all participants required to wear face shields and stay in personal booths with minimal contact to each other) and the installation of special devices which will disinfect the clothes and objects of all participants before entering the courtroom (e.g. disinfection chambers) and constantly clean the air while all persons are inside the courtroom. The adoption of such a procedural innovation will not merely allow the Court to operate normally during a pandemic but will also place the ICC at the forefornt of procedural innovation and enhance its international status via its innovative approach to working seamlessly while ensuring the safety of judges, staff and participants.

A judge should recuse himself/herself from a case only when he/she cannot perform his/her duties impartially and independently pursuant to Article 41§2(a) ICCRSt,[1] which utilises the open-ended expression “a judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground” [my emphasis].

This can occur when a close relative or even a former partner is accused of a crime or participates as a counsel in the proceedings to name but a few indicative examples. Furthermore, lack of impartiality could occur when a former counsel of the same accused for a previous crime became later a judge at a case involving his/her former client; or when the judge had testified as a witness or victim in the course of a preliminary investigation regarding the same case or a different case but with the same accused person(s).  Additionally, in the interests of justice and pursuant to the famous maxim “Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion” this could also occur under certain circumstances if the individuals involved were personally known to the judge or contacted the judge prior to the hearing. Finally a judge should recuse himself/herself from a case if there exists any kind of conflict of interest, an issue which is thoroughly analysed in a following question.

[1] Article 41§2(a) ICCRSt “A judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. A judge shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted”.

In view of the many years I have spent as an academic writer, and author of the book The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Switzerland: Springer, 2019), writing constitutes my second nature. Therefore, writing decisions myself is something I would love to do and have already done for several cases as a member of the ICC Disciplinary Board. However, depending on the workload and the number of duties assigned to me by the Court, I would not exclude the possibility of delegating the drafting of factual parts of a decision to assistants or interns according to my directions, provided of course that such delegation would conform with the ICC’s judicial tradition and practice and the Chamber would agree to such an approach.

Pursuant to the provisions of: a) Article 39§2(b)(iii) ICCRSt and b) Rule 7 RPE, it is clearly stipulated that the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence initially allowed only for a single judge in the pre-trial stage and not any delegation of authority to a Single Judge during trial. Nevertheless, in 2012 the RPE were amended in order to allow a Single Judge of the Trial Chamber to ensure the preparation of the trial (Rule 132bis RPE). However, due to concerns relating to the amendments’ conformity with Article 39(2)(b) ICCRSt and the undeniable fact that in the event of any conflict between the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence the Statute shall always prevail, a conservative approach was eventually adopted. As such, the role of the trial judge acting alone is rightly limited to the preparatory work while the more substantive issues remain solely within the remit of the full Trial Chamber. Therefore, it is eloquently stated in paragraph 6 of Rule 132bis RPE that “The judge shall not render decisions which significantly affect the rights of the accused or which touch upon the central legal and factual issues in the case, nor shall he or she, subject to sub-rule 5, make decisions that affect the substantive rights of victims.” [my emphasis] Consequently, based on the aforementioned provisions, I believe that the delegation of powers upon a single judge should always be exercised with caution and within the limits analysed above in order to: 1) ensure proper disclosure between the parties, 2) order protective measures, 3) deal with applications by victims for participation in the trial pursuant to Article 68§3 ICCRSt, 4) confer with the parties regarding issues referred to in Regulation 54 of the Regulations of the Court (status conferences’ orders),[1] 5) schedule procedural matters (excluding the date of the trial), 6) deal with the conditions of detention and related matters and 7) deal with any other preparatory matters that must be resolved and do not otherwise fall within the exclusive competence of the Trial Chamber.

[1] Pursuant to Regulation 54 under the title “Status conferences before the Trial Chamber” at a status conference, the Trial Chamber may issue an order regarding: “(a) The length and content of legal arguments and the opening and closing statements; (b) A summary of the evidence the participants intend to rely on; (c) The length of the evidence to be relied on; (d) The length of questioning of the witnesses; (e) The number and identity…of the witnesses to be called;  (f) The production and disclosure of the statements of the witnesses on which the participants propose to rely; (g) The number of documents as referred to in article 69, paragraph 2, or exhibits to be introduced together with their length and size;  (h) The issues the participants propose to raise during the trial; (i) The extent to which a participant can rely on recorded evidence…; (j) The presentation of evidence in summary form; (k) The extent to which evidence is to be given by an audio- or video-link; (l) The disclosure of evidence; (m) The joint or separate instruction by the participants of expert witnesses; (n) Evidence to be introduced under rule 69 as regards agreed facts; (o) The conditions under which victims shall participate in the proceedings; (p) The defences…to be advanced by the accused.

During the last sixteen years as a principal lawyer I have handled high-profile criminal and civil law cases ranging from the potential murder of a police officer by fellow officers (Kalyva application before the European Court of Human Rights) to the total erasure of significant financial debts for reasons related to human dignity. As a result, I was often explicitly and/or implicitly under constant pressure from parties and various actors for a considerable period of time. If I would have to single out an issue on which I worked continuously under great pressure for important actors as well as on behalf of the wider public, this would be The Power of Minus two-year public campaign I conceptualised  and faithfully implemented along with the Intellectum NGO team of volunteers. “The Power of Minus” public campaign had a remarkable impact, despite facing various challenges including strange incidents ranging from thefts (one laptop and office keys stolen under particularly mysterious circumstances) to other intimidating actions (internet threats, hundreds of reports to Facebook and other social media in order to ban our content).  However, neither myself nor the other team members were ever intimidated or discouraged by such incidences: we remained adamant that we were serving the public good and implementing a public campaign to promote human rights that was ethically commendable. Thus we continued and completed The Power of Minus two-year public campaign project with unparalleled success.

Undeniably, the independency of the judiciary is a critical issue for the conferment of justice, which has even led to the publication of many books examining this single issue, including Robert Stevens’ monograph “The Independence of the Judiciary: View from the Lord Chancellor’s Office” (Clarendon Press, 1993). In Britannica encyclopedia it is duly noted that judicial independence is “the ability of courts and judges to perform their duties free of influence or control by other actors, whether governmental or private. The term is also used in a normative sense to refer to the kind of independence that courts and judges ought to possess. That ambiguity in the meaning of the term judicial independence has compounded already existing controversies and confusions regarding its proper definition, leading some scholars to question whether the concept serves any useful analytical purpose. There are in general two sources of disagreement. The first is conceptual, in the form of a lack of clarity regarding the kinds of independence that courts and judges are capable of possessing. The second is normative, in the form of disagreement over what kind of judicial independence is desirable.”

I personally define an independent judge as one who examines impartially the evidence of the case file and weighs with absolute fairness the ‘for and against’ evidence/arguments of the parties before issuing with clear conscience his/her decision, without succumbing at any stage to any pressure, and while always complying with the rules of deontology.

Finally, I would also like to refer to the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which were adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and were endorsed by the UN General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 as they offer a sound basis for defining and understanding what an independent judge truly is and how an independent judge should conduct himself/herself in his/her ordinary life.

Given that a conflict of interest is usually regarded as a situation in which a person pursues multiple interests, financial, personal, ethical or otherwise, having more than one interest could jeopardise the proper pursuit of another. The Model Canon Rule 2.11 (Disqualification) of the American Bar Association thoroughly describes the principal instances where a judge should disqualify himself/herself, whenever such a situation arises. The same guidelines are duly described, albeit much more concisely, in Rule 34 RPE under the title “Disqualification of a judge, the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor” and  Article 42§2(a) ICCRSt which eloquently states that “[a] judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground”. Consequently in my view the existence of any kind of personal interest in a case, or the involvement of a judge in a private capacity in any legal proceedings, or the performance of conflicting functions prior to taking office, or the public expression of opinions relevant to a case constitute sound grounds for a judge recusing himself/herself from the case because of a potential conflict of interest.

I believe that such considerations should not in principle be taken into account when assessing a candidate’s suitability to be the judge at the ICC. My belief is not only based on ethical or human rights grounds (Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights) but also on the Rome Statute, which itself expressly stipulates in  Article 21§3 ICCRSt  that no such criteria should ever exist regarding the application and interpretation of law. Nonetheless, Article 36§8 ICCRSt justifiably stipulates that the States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the needs set out in connection with the membership of the Court. Namely: (i) to represent the principal legal systems of the world; (ii) equitable geographical representation; and (iii) fair representation of female and male judges.

I believe that the effective participation of victims in proceedings is an issue of great importance that requires more systemic changes and amendments in order to be implemented appropriately. However, I also believe that a judge could certainly assist with the victims’ effective participation in the proceedings by:

1) allowing the participation of victims in the pre-trial stage pursuant to Article 57 ICCRSt under the title “Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber”, which expressly states in paragraph 3(c) and (e) that it is within the powers of a Pre-Trial Chamber to provide where necessary for “the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and the protection of national security information” and  to take protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture “where a warrant of arrest or a summons has been issued under article 58 […] for the ultimate benefit of victims”.

2) enhancing the rights of the victims’ counsels and ordering the counsels’ access to facilities as early as possible and

3) assigning better qualified and experienced lawyers as counsel in order to apply the equality of arms principle lato sensu.

In reaching a decision, how would you approach the need to balance the rights of an accused person and the rights of victims, which are both protected by the ICC’s legal texts?

The need to balance the rights of an accused person and the rights of victims is a critical issue for the conferment of justice and its overall quality and therefore quite understandably an issue which has attracted the attention of scholars lately.[1] The Rome Statute considers ab initio this critical issue. It is clear that the provision of Article 53§1 ICCRSt (Initiation of an investigation) balances the rights of accused and the victims from the investigation stage onwards.[2]

Undoubtedly, the principal article regarding the victims’ protection and their participation in the proceedings is Article 68 ICCRSt, under the title “Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the Proceedings”, where it is stated:

1. The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender […] and health, and the nature of the crime […] where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. […] These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.
2. As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in article 67, the Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or a child […]
3. Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views […] to be presented and considered […] in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.

Moreover, Article 64 ICCRSt under “Functions and powers of the Trial Chamber” stresses in paragraph 2 that “The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses”. In paragraph 6(e) of the said Article it is reiterated that “In performing its functions […] during the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may […] [p]rovide for the protection of the accused, witnesses and victims”. Additionally Article 65 ICCRSt under the title “Proceedings on an admission of guilt” stresses in paragraph 4 that “Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may: (a) Request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses; or (b) Order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute  […]” Hence, the complete adherence to the aforementioned provisions and their just application and enforcement will greatly assist me in balancing the rights of an accused person and the rights of victims, given that all of them refer both to the accused and victims and establish a delicate balance between their rights.

On the other hand, Article 67 ICCRSt refers explicitly to the rights of the accused and the utmost importance of their respect. Hence it is duly stressed that the accused shall:
1) have a public, fair and impartial hearing;
2) be informed in an understandable language of the exact charge(s) and his/her rights;
3) have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his/her defence;
4) communicate freely with his/her counsel(s);
5) be tried without undue delay;
6) examine the witnesses against him or her and call and examine defence witnesses;
7) be entitled to raise defences and present evidence;
8) have gratis the assistance of a competent interpreter and translation services
9) not be compelled to testify or confess guilt and remain silent, without such silence affecting the determination of guilt or innocence;
10) be able to make an unsworn oral or written statement in his/her defence;
11) never been imposed upon him/her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal;
12) have knowledge of and access to evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which are in favour of his/her innocence or mitigate his/her guilt or affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.

Finally yet importantly, on a personal note, I believe that victims’ rights should always be fully respected and that victims should always have the right to express their views and concerns from a very early stage of the proceedings. However the rights of the victims should not reach the point where the rights of the accused are violated or victims act as a quasi ‘second prosecutor’ (as often ends up being the case in civil jurisdictions) or overtly delay proceedings. I also believe that the legal representatives of victims should be granted full access to the case file and confidential material, while the access for victims themselves should be more limited, following the sound practice which has been developed by the Court over the years. Finally the victims should be able to call and (cross-) examine witnesses but inevitably there must a limit on the number of witnesses that victims can call and the allocated time they can utilize for this purpose must always be appropriate to justice being conferred fairly and properly.

[1] Juan Pablo Perez-Leon-Acevedo and Joanna Nicholson (eds.), Defendants and Victims in International Criminal Justice: Ensuring and Balancing Their Rights, (London: Routledge), (2020).

[2] “(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice”.  Contemporaneously, the rights of the accused  are found in the 1(a) and 1(b) provisions of Article 53 ICCRSt where it is noted: “unless there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute”, “[t]he information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed” and “[t]he case is or would be admissible under article 17”.